 
	
Assault On 
				Moncada Barracks
After Batista took the power by a 
				military coup on 10 March 1952, Fidel Castro and his group began 
				to train young men that were aware of the absence of a political 
				force to face and to overthrow the tyranny of Batista by taking 
				part in the armed struggle against what they perceived to be an 
				illegitimate government. They used the campus of the University 
				of Havana and the other firing ranges in Havana (for example, 
				Quinta de los Molinos) and disguised themselves as businessmen 
				interested in clay pigeon shooting and hunting. 
Fidel Castro who was seeking an 
				opportunity to deal a blow to the military force of Baptista and 
				to spark a national uprising against the regime, decided to 
				carry out an assault to the Moncada barracks, the well-fortified 
				fortress in Santiago de Cuba, where support for the clandestine 
				movement against the government was strongest. The plan was 
				elaborated in secret at all. Besides Fidel Castro, the military 
				leader, it was known only by Abel Santamaría, the civil leader, 
				and Renato Guitart. The rebels learned what the objective was, 
				when they gathered at the farm in Siboney the night before the 
				attack.
The rebels were preferably young 
				people (the average age was 26, the same as that of Fidel 
				Castro), mostly Orthodox Party members or sympathizers,
				unaware to all personal ambition, and not infected for bad 
				habits of the traditional politics. They were recruited from the 
				lower middle class and working class: workers, peasants, 
				employees, students, modest professionals. Only four of the 160 
				rebels were university graduates, and most had only a primary 
				education. Castro avoided recruiting among intellectuals that 
				were more apt to challenge his ideas. The uniforms that were 
				necessary to attire the rebels, were obtained from the laundry 
				of a military hospital by one of its workers in exchange for 
				$200; consequently, they were mostly blue uniforms. In the 
				majority the weapons consisted of shotguns, rifles, and handguns 
				of various old models. Weapons, uniforms, and all necessary 
				resources for the fight were obtained without forcing the 
				wealthy people to contribute.
The plan was not so complicated: the 
				barracks would be taken by storm, so that seizing of the weapons 
				stored in the building and spreading false messages by using the 
				communication equipment of the army to confuse the soldiers of 
				Batista, would be possible. The captured weapons would be handed 
				out throughout city to use them in the armed actions in the 
				future. In the meantime, Santiago's radio station would be 
				secured to mobilize the public against the Batista government by 
				broadcasting the speeches of Eduardo Chibás. Eduardo Chibás was 
				a chief political figure of the prerevolutionary Cuba, guide, 
				and source of the inspiration for the Cuban youth of the time, 
				and founder of the Cuban People’s Party that militated Fidel 
				Castro. A Manifesto del Moncada, written by the young poet Raúl 
				Gómez García under Fidel Castro’s orientation was also ready to 
				be read to the folk at the radio. 
The date of the attack was 
				specifically chosen because the carnival in Santiago de Cuba is 
				traditionally held every year on July 25. People from different 
				parts of the region attend on that day, so that the presence of 
				so many young persons from other counties would not attract any 
				attention.
On the other hand, two days before 
				the assault on the Moncada Barracks, the Military Intelligence 
				Service (SIM) of the dictator Batista had informed Colonel 
				Chaviano, head of the barracks, that an attack on it was being 
				prepared, but the date was not known according to the 
				information obtained by an informer. Thus, the defense of the 
				garrison was reinforced before July 26 by increasing the number 
				of the soldiers. Chaviano was not at the barracks when the 
				attack occurred, but at the carnivals in Santiago de Cuba, and 
				he arrived at the barracks in the middle of the attack.
According to the plan, the rebels 
				were organized in three groups: the first group of about 90 men, 
				led by Fidel Castro, would attack the barracks, a second group 
				consisting of 6 men, including Raúl Castro, and led by Léster 
				Rodríguez, would take the court house (Palacio de Justica) 
				nearby, overlooking the barracks, and a third group, consisting 
				of 23 men and led by Abel Santamaría, Fidel Castro’s 
				second-in-command, would take the civil hospital (Hospital 
				Saturnino Lora) at the rear of the barracks, opposite the court 
				house, so that these three attacking groups would form a 
				covering crossfire. Fidel Castro had not invited his brother to 
				this action, and he was surprised to see his brother at the 
				Siboney Farm.  In the group of Abel Santamaría, there were 
				also two women, his sister Haydée Santamaría and his girlfriend 
				Melba Hernández, that would treat the wounded rebels. 
To support the assault on Moncada 
				Barracks, it was planned to take the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes 
				barracks in Bayamo simultaneously. This action included also the 
				blowing up of the bridges over the Cauto River, to prevent the 
				arrival of the troops from Santiago de Cuba. 28 rebels were 
				ready to participate in this action. 
On July 26, 1953, the rebels, 
				consisting of 135 armed persons, left the farm in Siboney very 
				early before the sunset, planning to attack the garrison at 
				dawn. The group formed a sixteen-automobile convoy to give the 
				appearance of being a delegation headed by a high-ranking 
				officer sent from western Cuba.
Even though the assault was planned 
				meticulously in theory, unfortunately, it didn’t work in 
				practice because of unforeseen technical problems. A car broke 
				down before reaching Moncada, so that some rebels couldn’t 
				involve in the struggle. 
The convoy disintegrated due to the 
				velocity difference of the motor vehicles. Several cars headed 
				off in the wrong direction and never made it to the barracks. 
				For example, the car driven by Ernesto Tizol was in supposedly 
				got lost in the city, and those cars that followed him never 
				reached the barracks, so that almost a third of the 
				revolutionaries could not participate in the attack. 
				Furthermore, one of the cars in this group was carrying the 
				heavy weapons; thus, many of the rebels that would have taken 
				part in the attack, were left behind without any weapon.
When the pioneering rebels called on 
				the sentries to make way for the “general”, there happened an 
				unexpected encounter with the patrolling soldiers, when Castro’s 
				car, the second in the pioneering group, was stopped. Following 
				their previous orders, once they saw that Castro’s car had 
				stopped, the rebels in the convoy behind jumped of their cars to 
				attack the garrison, believing that they were inside of the 
				barracks. According to Fidel Castro’s auto-criticism, this was a 
				fatal mistake, because the subsequent gunfire alerted the troops 
				throughout the barracks, before the buildings had been 
				infiltrated by the rebels. Only 5 rebels who were in the first 
				car were able to enter the barracks barbershop, of which 3 died 
				in combat, and another 2 were captured and executed. The 
				premature shootout that alerted the troops and allowed the 
				barracks' soldiers (250-300 at that time) to quickly mobilize 
				and in a few minutes the rebels were outnumbered more than 10 to 
				1. Under intense gunfire the attackers were reduced to fleeing 
				and cowering behind the cars. Although the unprotected 
				courthouse and the civil hospital were seized successfully, the 
				assault on the garrison was a fiasco. The rebels were confronted 
				with an enemy superior in weapons and in number. To continue the 
				fight under those conditions was a massive suicide, so that 
				Castro gave the order to withdraw to prevent further loss. The 
				fight began outside the barracks and lasted in a short battle of 
				positions about 20 minutes.
During the attack 15 soldiers and 3 
				policemen were killed, and 23 soldiers and 5 policemen were 
				wounded. The loss of the rebels during the fight was less: 9 
				rebels were killed, and 11 rebels were wounded (4 of them were 
				friendly fire).  18 rebels, captured by the soldiers in the 
				civil hospital, were shot to death in the small-arms target 
				range of the barracks within immediately two hours after the 
				attack, and their corpses were strewn throughout the combat 
				area, as if they were killed during the attack. Another reason 
				for the increase in losses is that Castro had not planned any 
				system of communication between the groups. The order was not 
				known to Santamaría and his group, who continued shooting at the 
				barracks from the Civil Hospital and were then arrested and shot 
				by the army. Abel Santamaría’s eyes were gouged out, while his 
				sister Haydée was forced to watch this process, and his corpse 
				was also passed off, as if he was killed during the attack 2 
				days before.
The real bloodshed started 
				immediately after the attack was driven back. Batista closed the 
				newspaper "Noticias de Hoy", organ of the Popular Socialist 
				Party, and applied censorship to the press and radio throughout 
				the country. Within 48 hours of the attack thousands of people 
				were detained by an extensive operation. As the consequence of 
				the brutal repression of Batista’s forces, 55 to 70 of the 
				fleeing rebels had been captured. They were tortured by the 
				Batista’s officers, and 34 of them were murdered. When Batista 
				transformed El Cuartel Móncada into a torture and death 
				workroom, some unworthy men transformed the military uniform 
				into butchers' aprons to execute each participant of the 
				insurrection. A handful of rebels escaped into the nearby 
				countryside, but most of them were apprehended shortly 
				thereafter; the rest managed to escape and returned to Havana.
On 21 September 1953 the trial begun 
				with 122 defendants, 65 of them being mostly political leaders 
				and opposition activists that were not involved in the 
				rebellion. 15 of 122 defendants, including Carlos Prio Socarras 
				(President of Cuba from 1948 until he was deposed by a military 
				coup led by Fulgencia Batista in 1952), Aureliano Sanchez Arango 
				(Cuban lawyer, politician and university professor that served 
				as Minister of Education and Foreign Minister in the period of 
				1948-1951), Jose Pardo Llada (Cuban journalist, radio 
				commentator most listened to in Cuba in the 1940s and 1950s), 
				and Blas Roca Calderio (Head of the Communist Party of Cuba for 
				28 years before the revolution) were underground or in exile and 
				never went to court. 51 of 99 captured rebels, including Fidel 
				Castro, were somewhat lucky because they were remanded for 
				trial.
The trial proceeded in 11 headings 
				and was completed just in 15 days. 19 rebels were found not 
				guilty, because the judges could not find any evidence to 
				confute their false testimony. Some leaders like Raúl 
				Castro, Oscar Alcalde, Pedro Miret, and Ernesto Tizol that 
				confessed their participation in the accused action, received 
				13-year prison sentence. 20 other rebels were sentenced to 10 
				years. 3 of the defendants that had refused to participate in 
				the attack at the last moment, got 3-year sentences. Dr. Melba 
				Hernandez Rodriguez del Rey and Haydée Santamaria were sentenced 
				to 7 months, since it was not possible to evidence that they 
				handled weapons.
During the trial Fidel Castro charged 
				the military with the systematic murder of the detainees. 
				Consequently, the chief of the Moncada barracks impeded Castro 
				to take part in the trial by claiming that Castro was ill and 
				could not attend the hearings. The tribunal then separated 
				Castro from the proceedings and granted him a separate trial. In 
				the prison an attempt was made to poison Fidel Castro. Despite 
				all the efforts to block Castro appearing in the court, he made 
				a speech with full enthusiasm in his own defense. A carbon copy 
				of the speech was smuggled page by page out of the court by the 
				stenographer that leaked it to Haydée Santamaría. This speech, 
				known by the last words of his speech as “la historia me 
				absolverá / history will absolve me”, was later published as the 
				manifesto of the revolution. Fidel Castro was sentenced to 15 
				years’ imprisonment as the leader of the whole insurrection.
Two years later a group of prisoners’ 
				mothers initiated a campaign to free the imprisoned rebels. Soon 
				a group of leaders, editors and intellectuals that were opposite 
				to Batista’s regime, signed a public appeal demanding freedom 
				for the political prisoners. Concurrently the Cuban Congress 
				passed a bill granting general amnesty to political prisoners. 
				After being signed by Batista, 30 rebels that were imprisoned, 
				resumed their freedom after 22 months of captivity.
				
 
	